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Abstract
This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistribu-
tive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distor-
tion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard.
Private insurance is available and individuals diﬀer in labor productiv-
ity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in
insurance markets is welfare-improving,and social insurance is gener-
ally desirable particularly when there is a negative correlation between
labor productivity and loss probability.
∗Prepared for ‘Public Finances and Public Policy in the New Millennium’,a confer-
ence on the occasion of Richard Musgrave’s 90th and CES’s 10th birthdays,University
of Munich,January 12-13,2001. We are grateful for comments by Gabrielle Demange,
Dominique Demougin and two referees. This paper presents research results of the Bel-
gian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State,Prime
Minister’s Oﬃce,Science Policy Programming. The scientiﬁc responsibility is assumed by
the authors.1 Introduction
One of the most compelling and lasting methodological insights of Richard
Musgrave’s (1959) classic The Theory of Public Finance was the conceptual
separation between the Allocative and Distributive branches of government.
It represented an operationalization of the First and Second Theorems of
Welfare Economics. In ideal circumstances, the Allocative Branch should be
concerned with taking the economy to the society’s utility possibilities fron-
tier by exploiting all gains from trade, while the Redistributive Branch alone
need be concerned with choosing the ethically preferred point. From a policy
perspective, the ability to separate eﬃciency and equity considerations is of
enormous importance. To the extent that the Allocative Branch can go about
its business of ensuring that resources are allocated eﬃciently, willingness-to-
pay can be used as the benchmark for public project evaluation, and inter-
personal welfare comparisons can be set aside. Much inﬂuential normative
public economics has revolved around investigating the circumstances under
which this separation applies, and the consequences of its not applying.
Two types of reasons have been stressed in the literature as to why eﬃ-
ciency and equity might not be separable. The ﬁrst devolves from the theory
of second best formalized by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).1 This literature
focused initially on the agnostic implications of exogenously given second-
best distortions for the use of market prices as signals of eﬃciency. Subse-
quently, with the advent of the optimal commodity tax literature, the exis-
tence of second-best distortions was found to make it necessary to incorporate
equity weights into shadow pricing rules for public projects.2 However, the
mere existence of commodity tax distortions did not vitiate the Musgravian
separation of Branches. Indeed, arguably the most important result of Dia-
mond and Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal contribution to optimal commodity tax
analysis was their so-called Production Eﬃciency Theorem. According to
this theorem, if commodity taxes were set optimally and all pure proﬁts
were taxed away, public sector shadow prices would be producer prices, at
least for private commodities. This essentially revitalized the Musgravian
1The idea of the theory of second best had been around for a long time. Elements of it
may be found,for examples,in the work on public sector pricing by Boiteux (1956),in the
taxation literature by Hotelling (1932) and Harberger (1964),and in the trade literature
by Meade (1955). For a survey of the theory of second best and its relation to public
economics,see Boadway (1997).
2The most complete summary of this can be found in Dr` eze and Stern (1987).
1separation result after the onslaught of the theory of second best. Unfor-
tunately, the Production Eﬃciency Theorem only applied with respect to
private commodities, and only then if taxes were in fact set optimally. In
the case of public goods, the Samuelson Rule had to be modiﬁed not only
to include the eﬀect of (perhaps optimal) linear tax distortions, but also to
incorporate equity considerations.3
The second reason why equity and eﬃciency considerations might not be
separable is in a sense more profound. It is because of an imperfectly in-
formed government. The classic work of Mirrlees (1971) implied that if the
government cannot observe private attributes of households, the Second The-
orem of Welfare Economics would be violated, and economic outcomes would
be restricted to the second-best utility possibilities frontier. Eﬀectively, this
theory supplied a fully endogenous explanation for why lump-sum redistribu-
tive taxation was not optimal: second-best tax distortions were useful as a
way of eliciting information, albeit in a costly way.4 Even here, however,
it is conceivable that eﬃciency considerations alone might be used to deter-
mine public sector allocation rules. Indeed, the Production Eﬃciency The-
orem survives: with optimal non-linear income taxes in place, public sector
shadow prices for private commodities are still producer prices. With pub-
lic goods, matters are slightly more complicated. Unlike with linear taxes,
the Samuelson Rule for public goods applies with optimal non-linear taxes
as long as leisure is separable from public and private goods (Boadway and
Keen (1993)).
While the above literature is concerned with public spending on goods and
services, this paper focuses on another prominent sort of spending — that on
social insurance. Why do we have social insurance and not private insurance
for such things as health care and disability? In a perfect Musgravian world,
one might expect that private insurance based on market eﬃciency principles
would suﬃce. Yet, in most countries social insurance takes a much larger
share of GDP than private insurance, and in fact often preceded private
insurance.
Traditionally, there are three types of reasons for public intervention in
the ﬁeld of insurance: transactions costs, market failures and redistribution.
3The modiﬁed Samuelson Rule reﬂecting linear tax distortions was obtained by Atkin-
son and Stern (1974). The further modiﬁcation to incorporate equity considerations may
be seen in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
4Guesnerie (1995) provides the most comprehensive account of the relationship between
asymmetric information and distortionary taxation.
2In the health care sector, private insurance exhibits higher transaction costs
than social insurance. This is partly because of high administrative costs.5
Market failures, the second reason, arise primarily from asymmetric informa-
tion, such as that between insurers and insurees (adverse selection and moral
hazard), and that between health care providers and health care consumers.
In keeping with the Musgravian tradition, our interest is in the third reason,
that is, the role of social insurance as a redistributive device.
In a full-information world of ﬁrst best, there is little reason for redis-
tribution using social insurance. The Distributive and Allocative functions
of the government can be separated, so one would expect income taxation
to achieve all the desired redistribution, and social insurance to operate ac-
cording to the market rule of actuarial fairness. However, in a second best
world of distortionary taxation, we will show that social insurance can be a
powerful device for redistribution, complementing the tax-transfer system.
It has been established in the literature that if risks are negatively related
to income so that the poor face higher risks on average, then we have an obvi-
ous redistributive argument for social insurance. As shown by Rochet (1989)
and Cremer and Pestieau (1996), social insurance combined with a standard
distortionary income tax can redistribute more eﬀectively. The reason is that
redistributing through social insurance does not involve the same distortion,
and this is even more so when social insurance is less administratively costly
than private insurance.6
This result has been developed in a setting where the risk probability
is given and any loss can be compensated for without restriction. In other
words, ex ante and ex post moral hazard were assumed away. When either
one is taken into account, it appears that the case for social insurance is not
as strong, and that, unlike in the above analyses, full coverage is no longer
necessarily socially desirable. The purpose of this paper is to study those
two types of moral hazard in an economy in which a linear income tax and a
social insurance can be used jointly along with actuarially fair, but possibly
costly, private insurance.7
5These costs are linked to the small scale of private insurance ﬁrms and to their adver-
tisement costs. On this,see Diamond (1992) and Mitchell (1998). The point goes back to
Arrow (1963).
6See also Petretto (1999).
7Blomqvist and Horn (1984) bears some similarities with our paper even though it is
not concerned with moral hazard. These authors also examine the case for public insurance
when actuarially fair private insurance is available and individuals diﬀer in both labour
productivity and illness probability. No labour is supplied when ill,and public insurance
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
and assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 consider two benchmark cases. In the
ﬁrst, there is perfect information and the government can make lump-sum
redistributive transfers. In this case, Musgravian separation applies: despite
moral hazard, actuarially fair insurance can be provided by the private sec-
tor, and all redistributive objectives can be accomplished by the tax-transfer
system. In the second benchmark, there is no moral hazard, but the public
sector is restricted to distortionary taxation—linear progressive taxation for
simplicity. In this case, full social insurance is provided, crowding out private
insurance. Section 5 then considers ex post moral hazard along with linear
progressive taxation, and Section 6 ex ante moral hazard. In each case, there
is generally a redistributive role for public intervention in private insurance
markets, though the direction of intervention is ambiguous. Section 7 extends
the ex post moral hazard case to a setting in which there are extra adminis-
trative costs associated with private insurance provision. Finally, Section 8
oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Model and assumptions
The economy consists of three types of decision-makers—households, insur-
ance ﬁrms and the government. Households face an idiosyncratic risk of
accident, but might be able to take hidden actions that aﬀect the size of the
loss in the event of an accident—ex post moral hazard—or that aﬀect the
probability of the accident occurring—ex ante moral hazard. Households
diﬀer both in productivity and in accident risk. Insurance companies can
observe household risk, and provide insurance competitively and—except in
Section 7 where administrative costs are introduced—actuarially fairly.8 The
government’s objective is to redistribute income among households, but be-
cause it cannot observe productivities, it is restricted to using distortionary
policy instruments (except in Section 3). Decision-making can be thought of
as occurring sequentially. The government chooses its policies ﬁrst, followed
by the insurance ﬁrms, and then households. In each case, the outcomes of
consists of a uniform lump-sum beneﬁt to the ill.
8That is,there is no adverse selection. Our assumptions are generally designed to
ensure that private insurance ﬁrms can provide insurance eﬃciently,thereby eliminating
insurance market failure as a reason for government intervention.
4subsequent stages are fully anticipated, so that equilibria of interest will be
sub-game perfect.
To be more speciﬁc, we use as an example the case of health insurance,
though the analysis would apply more generally to other types of personal
risks faced by households. We consider two states of the world, denoted by 0
for good health and 1 for ill health. There are n types of individuals indexed
by i =1 ,...,n, each characterized by a wage rate and a risk characteristic.
The wage rate for a type-i person is exogenously given by wi. In the absence
of ex ante moral hazard, his or her exogenous probability of illness is πi.
Thus, all households with a given wage have the same probability of illness,
which simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. The proportion of households of
type i is given by fi, where
 
fi = 1. With ex ante moral hazard, type
i households can aﬀect the probability of illness according to the function
πi(x), where x is preventive spending which takes place before the state of
health is revealed to the household. The function πi(x) is decreasing in x
with πi(∞) > 0.9
In the good state, health status is exogenously given as h0. In the bad
state, health status is h1 = ¯ h + m(z), where z is curative expenditure on
health improvement, and m (z) > 0,m   (z) < 0. Expenditures z that are
chosen by the household in case of ex post moral hazard are undertaken after
the state of health is revealed to the household. In this case, we assume that
h1 = ¯ h + m(z) <h 0 for all values of z (i.e. m(∞) <h 0 − ¯ h), so treatment
cannot bring health status if ill to a level as high as health status if not ill (we
depart from this assumption in Section 4). Notice that the parameters h0
and ¯ h, as well as the function m(z), are the same for all types of households.
Only the probabilities of good health diﬀer.
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, where g( 
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i) is increasing and strictly convex. In
this case, labour supply depends only on the after-tax wage rate and z on
9With ex ante moral hazard,we could as well assume that πi(x) is the same for all
households,as long as x is a normal good.
5its out-of-pocket price: there are no income or cross-price eﬀects. In partic-
ular, labour supply is then state-independent. With a more general utility
function, labour could be higher in the bad state if the individual has to
compensate for private health care spending or lower if ill health increases
the disutility of labour.10 Naturally, households maximize expected utility,
weighted by the probabilities πi for state 1 (ill health) and 1 − πi for state
0 (good health). Households take government policies and private insurance
premiums as given. They choose x before the state of health is determined,
and c, ,z after the state is determined.
Insurance ﬁrms are perfectly competitive. They oﬀer insurance policies
{pi,P i} to households of type i, where pi is the proportion of health expendi-
tures zi covered (reimbursed) and Pi is the total premium. Insurance compa-
nies anticipate the eﬀect of their insurance policies on curative expenditures
zi in the case of ex post moral hazard, and on preventive expenditures xi in
the case of ex ante moral hazard. Initially we ignore administrative costs, in
which case competition entails that premiums are given by:
Pi = πi(xi)pizi i =1 ,...,n (2)
In a later section, we let there be a loading factor equal to k ≥ 0. Then
premiums for type-i households are Pi =( 1+k)πi(xi)pizi.
The government has two sorts of policy instruments—tax-transfer policies
and social insurance. Except in the following section where the government
can impose lump-sum taxes and transfers on households according to their
types, tax-transfer policy consists of a linear progressive income tax with
marginal tax rate of t and a lump-sum poll subsidy of a per household.
Social insurance covers a proportion s of curative expenditures zi, ﬁnanced
out of general tax revenues. Notice that the same rate of social insurance
applies to all households. However, in the full information case considered in
the next section, the government is able to oﬀer a separate social insurance
rate si to each household type. Denote total insurance coverage by σi = pi+s
(or pi + si in the full information case).
As mentioned, there are three main stages of decision-making in this
economy representing the sequence in which the decisions occur:
Stage 1: The government chooses its policies {t,a,s}. It cannot observe
individual types or individual demands for goods, leisure or insurance, but
10A natural extension of this modeling would be to have the labor supply falling to 0 in
the bad sate of nature.
6can observe incomes. It knows preferences and the distribution of individuals
by type i. The government anticipates the eﬀect of its policies both on the
insurance market and subsequently on households.
Stage 2: The competitive insurance industry sells private insurance to
households. Market equilibrium (competition for customers, with zero prof-
its) determines pi and Pi. The insurance industry is assumed to be able to
observe household risk types, so there is no adverse selection problem. Thus,
insurance ﬁrms are better informed than the government since they can ob-
serve πi. In this stage, {t,a,s} are taken as given, and household behaviour
is correctly anticipated.





xi are chosen before the state of health is revealed. All other variables are
state-speciﬁc since they are chosen after the state is revealed (zi is chosen
only in the bad state). Households take {t,a,s,pi,P i} as given from the
previous two stages.
The equilibrium is assumed to be sub-game perfect, so we proceed to solve
it by backward induction. The method of solution can best be illustrated by
considering as a benchmark the full information case.
3 The full information benchmark
In this benchmark, the government can observe individual types i, so all poli-
cies can be type-speciﬁc. The government gives a lump-sum transfer of ai to
households of type i, as well as an individualized social insurance coverage
rate of si.11 Total coverage is then σi = si + pi. We begin by analyzing
household choice and proceed backwards to earlier stages.
Stage 3: Household choice




i = wi 
1




i = wi 
0
i + ai − xi − Pi,
where the household can choose   and z after the state has been revealed.
Given that no z will be chosen in the good state, the problem for household
11An extension here and elsewhere in the paper could involve imposing a subsidy on








i + ai − xi − (1 − σi)z
1
i − Pi,¯ h + m(zi), 
1
i)
+(1 − πi(xi))u(wi 
0










 j =0 ,j =0 ,1
zi : −(1 − σi)ui
c1 + m (zi)ui
h1 =0 ,
xi : π 
i(xi)(ui (1) − ui (0)) − πi(xi)ui
c0 − (1 − πi(xi))ui
c1 =0 ,
where ui (j) is the utility level achieved in state j =0 ,1. The solution to this
problem yields  0
i(ai−Pi),  1
i(ai−Pi,s i+pi),z i(ai−Pi,s i+pi),x i(ai−Pi,s i+pi),



















Stage 2: Insurance market equilibrium
Insurance ﬁrms are perfectly competitive and compete in insurance poli-
cies. Firms take as given the policies oﬀered by other ﬁrms and the level
of utility that households can achieve by those policies. Each ﬁrm then of-
fers households of type i a combination {pi,P i} to maximize proﬁts, given
the utility level achieved elsewhere and anticipating household behaviour in
Stage 3. Thus the problem of a representative insurance ﬁrm with respect to
each type i can be written as:
Max
{Pi,pi}
Pi − πi(xi(ai − Pi,s i + pi))pizi(ai − Pi,s i + pi)
s.t. vi(ai − Pi,s i + pi) ≥ ¯ vi
where ¯ vi is given by the industry as a whole. In market equilibrium all ﬁrms
behave identically and proﬁts are driven to zero by free entry. In eﬀect, the
8industry-wide utility level ¯ vi is competed up until proﬁts equal zero. Thus,
equilibrium in the insurance industry can be characterized as the solution to




vi(ai − Pi,s i + pi)
s.t. Pi = πi(xi(ai − Pi,s i + pi))pizi(ai − Pi,s i + pi)
The Lagrangean expression is:
£ = vi(ai − Pi,s i + pi)+λi[Pi − πi(xi(ai − Pi,s i + pi))pizi(ai − Pi,s i + pi)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are:
Pi : vi
P + λi[1 − πipizi




p − λi[πizi + πipizi





p are given by (3) in anticipation of Stage 3. The solution to
this problem gives Pi(ai,s i) and pi(ai,s i), and the value function is deﬁned
as Vi(ai,s i). Note that because of the moral hazard problem, pi < 1, since
pi = 1 leads to zi being indeﬁnitely high. Also, as long as si < 1, pi > 0
generally. Indeed at pi =0 ,d£/dpi = πizi(ui
c1 − Eui
c) and it is plausible to
assume that ui
c1 >u i
c0 since one can expect that c1
i <c 0
i. It is noteworthy
that if si < 1, inequality pi > 0 always holds with a quasi-linear speciﬁcation
of the utility function: u(c+h−g( )). Again applying the envelope theorem























where we have used (3) and the ﬁrst-order conditions for Pi and pi.
9Stage 1: Government policy
The government chooses lump-sum taxes ai and public insurance si to
maximize the sum of utilities subject to its budget constraint, anticipating
the outcomes of the subsequent two stages. Thus, its objective function is  
fiVi(ai,s i), and its budget constraint is
 
fi{ai+siπi(xi(ai−Pi(ai,s i),s i+









siπi(xi(ai − Pi(ai,s i),s i + pi(ai,s i)))zi(ai − Pi(ai,s i),s i + pi(ai,s i))}.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are, using the envelope results (4) from Stage 2:
ai : λi − γ [1 + siπidzi/dai + siziπ 
idxi/dai]=0 ,
si : λiπizi − γ [πizi + siπidzi/dsi + siziπ 
idxi/dsi]=0 .
Note that the total eﬀects of ai and si on zi and xi take into account the
eﬀect that government policies will have on private insurance coverage and






















Therefore, si =0 :There is no role for public insurance in the full-information
benchmark.12 That also means there would be no role for social insur-
ance s that would not discriminate among households of diﬀerent types.13
Blomqvist and Horn (1984) reach the same conclusion in a framework similar
to ours where there is however no moral hazard.14 Also from the ﬁrst-order
12Social insurance is not needed but cannot be excluded. Indeed what matters in the
present setting is total coverage σi which can result from any combination of si and pi.
Any imposition of si would be oﬀset by a reduction in pi. Of course,lump-sum subsidy
ai must be adjusted according to each combination.
13The result that si = 0 runs counter to a standard result in the insurance literature
that there will be market failure under ex ante moral hazard,though not necessarily under
ex post. See,for example,Pauly (1974) and Marshall (1976). See also Gaynor et al (2000)
who show that imperfect competition does not alleviate the moral hazard problem.
14See Proposition 2 in their paper.
10condition on ai, si = 0 implies λi = γ for all households. Therefore, from the














Thus, the government does not equalize expected utilities in the full infor-
mation case because of the moral hazard problem.
We turn now to the case where the government is imperfectly informed,
and is restricted to pursuing its redistribute objectives using a linear pro-
gressive tax.
4 The case without moral hazard
It is useful also to consider the case where there is no moral hazard of either
type. Assume for simplicity that, unlike in the previous case, there is only
one value of curative expenditures ˆ z and that it fully restores health status
in the ill health state. That is, ˆ z is such that h1 = ¯ h + m(ˆ z)=h0. Assume
also that πi is exogenously ﬁxed for all i. There is a private insurance market
that oﬀers households coverage pi and charges a premium Pi adjusted to their
illness probability, so that Pi = πipiˆ z.
Suppose ﬁrst that there is public insurance that covers a proportion s of
expenditures ˆ z , and that households can purchase a private insurance freely.
We omit explicit consideration of the insurance industry here because the
absence of moral hazard makes the solution of the Stage 2 problem straight-
forward. It is clear that a competitive insurance industry would replicate the
extent of coverage most preferred by each type of household. With a linear
income tax, we can now write the expected utility of each household of type
i as:
U
i = πiu((1 − t)wi 
1




+(1 − πi)u((1 − t)wi 
0
















11As long as there is less than full insurance, we have ui
c1 >E [ui
c]. This implies
that ∂Ui/∂pi > 0 for any value of pi < 1 − s. Therefore, as is well-known,
in the absence of moral hazard it is optimal for all households to choose full
insurance coverage, pi =1 −s for any s. In addition to their private insurance
coverage, households choose their labour supplies conditional on the two
health states:  
j
i(t,a,s),j=0 ,1. If there is full insurance, consumption and
labour supply are identical in the two states of nature. However to keep the
analysis as general as possible we continue to distinguish the two states of
nature.
Let us now look at the optimal behaviour of the public sector. It will
implement a linear progressive tax for redistributive reasons. The question
is whether it will also want to intervene in insurance markets. If it does, we
know that whatever the value of s, households choose their private insurance
coverage so that their health expenditures are fully reimbursed (pi =1− s).
Given the tax parameters t and a and social insurance coverage s, the




i(t,a,s)+( 1− πi)twi 
0
i(t,a,s) − πisˆ z − a} =0 . (5)




fi{πiu(wi (1 − t) 
1




+(1− πi)u(wi (1 − t) 
0






i (·)+( 1− πi)twi 
0
i (·) − a − πisˆ z]},
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint
and (·)=( t,a,s).
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=0 , (8)
12where ¯ π =
 
















is the so-called net marginal social utility of income of type i households in
state of the world j. Note that in case of complete insurance, b1
i = b0
i (since
health status, consumption and labour supply are identical in the two states)
and b
1













Whether it is optimal to have some public coverage of health expenditures
therefore depends upon the sign of cov[b1
i,πi]. Suppose that πi and wi are
negatively correlated. Then, πi and b1
i are positively correlated, and as a
consequence it is desirable to push s up to its ceiling value, namely unity.16
When s = 1, there is no need for private insurance. This result, which is the
polar opposite of the full information case, is that obtained by Rochet (1989)
and Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
Even though this is not our main concern, one can also derive the optimal






where ωi = wi(1 − t), and ∂ 
j
i/∂ωi is the compensated derivative of labour
supply of a type-i household in state j. This expression is standard, with
the numerator being the equity term and the denominator the eﬃciency
term. Note that since health expenditures are fully reimbursed, (10) could
be simpliﬁed by dropping the expected value operator.
15Given that s + pi =1 ,  i =  i(t,a,1) and ∂ i
∂s =0 .
16It is worth noting that even with identical wi social insurance is desirable as the only
way from “good” to “bad” risks.
13The weakness of the above analysis is that it implicitly assumes that
both social and private insurance have no inﬂuence on the size of the loss
z to be compensated, nor on the probability π of loss. We now turn to
these two possibilities. Now, the amount of the loss that can be recouped
depends on each agent’s behaviour, and the probability of the loss is also the
responsibility of each agent. With these two additions, we will see that full
insurance is no longer desirable. It is useful to treat the two sorts of moral
hazard separately.
5 Ex post moral hazard
Here we assume that the πi’s are given (and either negatively or positively
correlated with wages wi), but that individuals can inﬂuence their health
status following an illness. By investing in curative expenditures z, they can
reach a health status h1 = ¯ h + m(z) <h 0. A proportion of expenditures on
health improvement is covered by social insurance, s, and private insurance,
pi. As before, we solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium by backward
induction.
Stage 3: Household choice
Households of type i take as given government policies a, t and s, and
private insurance policy parameters pi and Pi. The budget constraints in the
two states of health are now:
c1
i =( 1 − t)wi 1
i + a − (1 − σi)zi − Pi,
c0
i =( 1 − t)wi 0
i + a − Pi.





πiu((1 − t)wi 
1
i + a − (1 − σi)zi − Pi,¯ h + m(zi), 
1
i)
+(1 − πi)u((1 − t)wi 
0




The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
 
j
i :( 1 − t)wiui
cj + ui
 j =0 ,j =0 ,1
zi : −(1 − σi)ui
c1 + m (zi)ui
h1 =0 .
14The solution to this problem yields  0
i(t,a − Pi),  1
i(t,a − Pi,s+ pi),z i(t,a −



















Stage 2: Insurance market equilibrium
As before, insurance industry equilibrium can be characterized as the
outcome from choosing private coverage pi and premiums Pi to maximize
household expected utility by type subject to a type-speciﬁc zero proﬁt (or
actuarial fairness) condition, and anticipating the consequences for Stage
3. The insurance equilibrium for a type-i household is the solution to the
maximization of the following Lagrangean:
£ = vi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi)+λi[Pi − πipizi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are:
Pi : vi
P + λi[1 − πipizi
P]=0 ,
pi : vi






c1 from (11). The solution to this prob-
lem gives Pi(t,a,s) and pi(t,a,s). As already mentioned in Section 3, it is
plausible that pi > 0 as long as s<1. The maximum value function for












s = λiπizi, (12)
where we have used the ﬁrst-order conditions on Pi and pi as well as (11).
Stage 1: Government policy
The government chooses the linear tax parameters t, a and the level of
social insurance s to maximize the sum of utilities subject to its budget con-








i(t,a − Pi(·),s+ pi(·))
+(1 − πi) 
0
i(t,a − Pi(·))] − a − sπizi(t,a − Pi(·),s+ pi(·))}
15where Pi(t,a,s) and pi(t,a,s) are determined in Stage 2.


















fi {−πizi + twiE [d i/ds] − sπidzi/ds} =0 .
















































From (14), we obtain:
 
fiE[bi]=¯ b =1 ,
where b
j
i = λi/γ + twi[d 
j
i/da] − sπi[dzi/da] is the net marginal social utility
of income for a type-i person in state of the world j. Next, combining (13)
and (15), we obtain:





























where d ˜ zi/ds = dzi/ds − πizidzi/da is a compensated total demand deriva-
tive, and similarly for d˜  i/ds. These are total demand derivatives since, for
16example, dzi/ds is the total derivative of zi with respect to s, meaning that
zi is a function not only of s but also of Pi and pi, which are in turn functions
of s. Indeed an increase in s causes pi and Pi to fall, which is accounted for
in these total derivatives.
Equation (16) consists of two terms. The ﬁrst term is analogous to the
standard expression for the optimal marginal tax rate as in (10) above. The
denominator is the eﬃciency term and gives the compensated eﬀect of an
increase in s (ﬁnanced by a state-invariant lump-sum tax) on curative ex-
penditures. We expect this term to be positive, though it is not necessarily
the case. The larger it is, the smaller is the value of s. The numerator—the
covariance between the marginal social utility of income, bi, and πizi—is the
equity term. If, as in Rochet (1989), the covariance between bi and πi is
positive, we still have to verify whether taking πizi instead of πi changes the
sign. If we assume that πi and wi are ‘suﬃciently’ negatively correlated and
that zi does not increase much with wi, then the covariance term is positive.
The second term is related to a second-best eﬀect. Changes in s induce
indirect changes in the deadweight loss due to the distortion imposed by the
marginal tax rate t.I f   increases with s, an increase in s will indirectly
increase tax revenues. Since the social value of an additional unit of tax rev-
enues is greater than one, this would enhance the case for social insurance.17
In general, it is diﬃcult to say whether equation (16) yields s greater or
less than zero,18 despite the fact that in the absence of moral hazard we earlier
obtained s = 1. More precise results can be obtained only by using speciﬁc











. In this case, labour supply is independent of
s. Moreover, zi depends only on σi = s + pi: more precisely, dzi/dσi =









fiπi(1 + ∂pi/∂s − πizi∂pi/∂a)/m  (zi)
(17)
17By the same token,an expression for the optimal tax rate t would include an interac-
tion eﬀect of the tax rate on curative expenditures. This would be analogous to the results
of Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) who argued that an indirect way for government policy to
address the moral hazard problem would be to tax commodities that are complementary
with the moral hazard activity.
18A negative s could be interpreted as a tax on curative spending,which is an imperfect
way of taxing private insurance premiums.
17In the Appendix, we show that for this quasi-linear utility function, ∂pi/∂s−
πizi∂pi/∂a > −1, so that the denominator of (17) is positive. Then, assuming
that the correlation between πi and wi is negative enough for the covariance
term to be positive, the optimal value of s will be positive. However, unlike
in Rochet (1989), s<1 because of moral hazard. This can be seen from the
ﬁrst-order condition on s above. As s approaches 1, zi goes to ∞, so that
∂£/∂s becomes negative when s approaches 1.
6 Ex ante moral hazard
Ex ante moral hazard involves preventive expenditures that can aﬀect the
probability of illness. For simplicity, we assume that, as in Section 4, cura-
tive expenditures are ﬁxed at the level ˆ z, and thus the good health status
h0 is also attained in the ill health state. We can thus exclude the health
status variable from the utility function. We proceed as usual by backward
induction, looking ﬁrst at the household’s choices, then at private insurance
market equilibrium, and ﬁnally at the government’s optimization.
Stage 3: Household choice
Given government policies a, t and s and private insurance policies pi and





πi(xi)u((1 − t)wi 
1
i + a − xi − (1 − σi)ˆ z − Pi, 
1
i)
+(1 − πi(xi))u((1 − t)wi 
0
i + a − xi − Pi, 
0
i)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are assumed to be interior and are given by:
 
j
i :( 1 − t)wiui
cj + ui
 j =0 j =0 ,1
xi : π 
i(xi)(ui (1) − ui (0)) − E [ui
c]=0
where ui (j) is the utility level achieved in state j =0 ,1. This yields supply
functions  0
i(t,a−Pi),  1
i(t,a−Pi,s+pi),x i(t,a−Pi,s+pi), and the indirect
















p = πi(xi)ˆ zu
i
c1 (18)
Stage 2: Insurance market equilibrium
In equilibrium, insurance policies oﬀered by the private sector to type-i
households maximize:
£ = vi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi)+λi[Pi − πi(xi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi))piˆ z]
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are:
Pi : vi










p = πi(xi)ˆ zui
c1 from (18). The solution to this
problem gives Pi(t,a,s) and pi(t,a,s), where as before it is plausible that
pi > 0 as long as s<1. The maximum value function is Vi(t,a,s). By the
envelope theorem and using (18), we obtain its properties:
V
i
t = −E[wi iu
i








s = λiπi(xi)ˆ z (19)
Stage 1: Government policy
As usual, the government chooses {t,a,s} to maximize a utilitarian social
welfare function subject to its budget constraint and the reaction functions






i(·)+( 1− πi(·)) 0
i(·)]
−a − sπi(xi(·))ˆ z}
where (·)=( t,a − Pi(t,a,s),s+ pi(t,a,s)) in which Pi(t,a,s) and pi(t,a,s)
are determined in Stage 2. Proceeding exactly as before, rearrangement of
















i = λi/γ + twi[d 
j
i/da] − sˆ zπ 
i[dxi/da]. Note that all indirect eﬀects
on the government budget of changing a are accounted for, including those
through induced changes in the probability πi.
The interpretation of the terms in this expression is identical to (16) for
the ex post moral hazard case. The denominator—the eﬃciency term involv-
ing the eﬀect of social insurance on preventive expenditures—is expected to
be positive, since π 
i < 0 and we expect that a compensated increase in s will
reduce preventive expenditures. The equity eﬀect, reﬂected in the covariance
term, is positive provided that xi is normal, given that πi(xi) decreases as wi
increases and that πi is not positively correlated with wi. The second term
reﬂects the indirect, or second-best, eﬀect. Its sign depends upon how labour
supplies are aﬀected by changes in the social insurance rate s.
In general, it is diﬃcult to sign s from equation (20), especially given the
fact that the derivatives of  i and xi are total ones.19 It is instructive again
to consider as a special case that of quasi-linear preferences, which are here
given simply by u(c
j
i − g( 
j
i)) since health status is the same in both states.






It can be shown by a comparative static analysis of household and insur-
ance industry behaviour that a suﬃcient condition for s>0 is that private
insurance is a normal good.
7 Administrative costs
As mentioned, it has been documented that there are administrative costs
of operating a competitive insurance industry that may be avoided by a
single-payer government system. Administrative costs eﬀectively increase
the cost of private insurance relative to a public scheme. There are two
consequences of this. First, and most obviously, the attractiveness of social
insurance is enhanced relative to private insurance, despite the informational
disadvantages the public sector might face. Second, from the fact that the
cost of private insurance is not actuarially fair, it is no longer the case that
19It is,however,possible to show that the solution will generally be an interior one. It
is impossible that s = 1 as this would induce xi to go to ∞. On the other hand,it is
possible that s = 0,though this would be by chance only.
20all households will necessarily purchase private insurance. To illustrate this,
we employ the case of ex post moral hazard. The model is the same as in
Section 5 above except for the administrative costs associated with private
insurance. In particular, we assume that there is a loading factor equal to
a proportion k>0 of insurance premiums.20 The no-proﬁt condition then
becomes Pi =( 1+k)πipizi.
The same three stages of decision-making apply. Household behaviour
in Stage 3 is essentially the same as before, with Roy’s identities from (11)




vi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi) s.t. Pi =( 1+k)πipizi(t,a − Pi,s+ pi)
We can no longer be sure that there will be an interior solution for pi,e v e n
if s = 0. That is, a non-negative constraint on coverage, pi ≥ 0, may be
binding. Given that, the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are:
Pi : vi
P + λi[1 − (1 + k)πipizi
P]=0
pi : vi
p − λi(1 + k)[πizi + πipizi
p] ≤ 0
where the inequality holds if the constraint pi ≥ 0 is binding. We might
expect that higher wage groups will demand greater coverage. In fact, a
comparative static analysis on these ﬁrst-order conditions reveals that, in
general, it is not clear on which income groups the inequality constraint is
binding. That is, ∂pi/∂wi 7 0. It turns out that, as in the Appendix, a
suﬃcient condition for ∂pi/∂wi > 0 is the familiar one that private insurance
is a normal good. In any case, the solution to this problem gives Pi(t,a,s)
and pi(t,a,s), along with the value function Vi(t,a,s). By the envelope
theorem, we obtain in the usual way:
V
i
t = −E[wi iu
i






s ≤ (1 + k)λiπizi (21)
where the inequality holds when pi ≥ 0 is binding.
Let I0 be the set of household types i such that the constraint pi ≥
0 is binding, that is, the set that purchases no private insurance. Then
20We are assuming that k>0. Positive loading factors in private health insurance are
well documented in the literature. See for instance Phelps (1992),ch. 10. In some sectors
private insurance might be less costly than social insurance. The results should then be
modiﬁed accordingly.
21government optimization yields a set of conditions analogous to (13), (14),


















The denominator on the right-hand side of (22) and ﬁrst two terms in the
numerator are the same as before. They capture respectively the eﬃciency,
the equity and second-best indirect eﬀects. As before, they have ambiguous
signs except in special cases. We expect the denominator and the equity term
to be positive, but in general these terms are all ambiguous. The second-best
term reﬂecting the indirect eﬀect of changes in s on the deadweight loss of
taxation will disappear if the utility function is quasi-linear in consumption
and health status. The last two terms of the numerator are related to the
ineﬃciency of private insurance: they vanish if k = 0. The term involving
k reﬂects the eﬃciency cost of having individuals purchase expensive private
insurance. The term involving those households that are quantity constrained
(i ∈ I0) reﬂects the beneﬁts of providing social insurance to those households
for whom private insurance coverage is too expensive. Overall, since the last
two terms are both positive, the existence of administrative costs of private
insurance tends to enhance the case for public insurance coverage s, which
is not surprising.
8 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the ﬁnding of Rochet (1989) that with
distortionary income taxation, social insurance is desirable as a redistributive
device. The gist of his argument was the distortionary feature of income
taxation. With a non-distortionary redistributive tax, there would be no
need for social insurance as long as it is not cheaper than market-provided
insurance. One of our purposes was to see how robust this ﬁnding was when
introducing moral hazard.
We distinguished between ex ante and ex post moral hazard and showed
that the case for public intervention in insurance markets remains. However,
while in Rochet’s analysis, optimal social insurance is complete and crowds
out private insurance, in the presence of moral hazard, that is no longer the
22case. Public and private insurance will generally exist side by side. Moreover,
it is no longer necessarily the case that optimal social insurance rates be
positive. That is even true in the case where there is a negative correlation
between productivity and the expected value of spending incurred to correct
for the loss. We also introduce the idea that social insurance could be less
costly than private insurance. This clearly strengthens the case for social
insurance, and increases the chances that it should be positive.
A number of extensions to the current analysis could be contemplated.
First, it might be interesting to see whether or not an optimal non-linear
tax would dampen the case for social insurance. Evidence from related lit-
eratures suggests that even when non-linear taxes are set optimally, the case
for second-best policy instruments typically remains intact. Second, for the
case of ex ante moral hazard, we could consider the possibility of subsidizing
preventive spending. Third, the viewpoint adopted here was purely norma-
tive. It would be interesting to adopt a political economy approach with
social insurance being determined by voting.21 Finally, instead of treating
both types of moral hazard separately, it would be useful to combine them in
a single model, although that will certainly increase the complexity without
resolving the ambiguity.
21In that respect,see Hindriks and De Donder (2000).
23Appendix
In this appendix we assume that the utility function is quasi-linear and derive
the comparative statics for pi under ex post moral hazard. These will then
be used to show the necessary conditions to have a positive value for s.






i)), the ﬁrst-order conditions for
the household’s problem simplify to:
(1 − t)wi − g
 (l
j
i)=0 a n d − (1 − σi)+m
 (zi)=0
and solve as l1
i=l0
i=l((1 − t)w) and zi=z(σi). Thus labour supply depends
only on net-of-tax wages and is state independent, and curative expenditures
only depend on the coverage rate. Using these results, the Stage 2 ﬁrst-order






Diﬀerentiation of this expression yields:

























∆wi =( 1− t)l∆a











p < 0 (by the SOC)
where uii denotes the second derivative of u.
In general, the eﬀects of the exogenous variables on the sign of pi are
ambiguous. However, if we assume that private insurance is a normal good,















> 0(by the SOC)
24Note that even though an increase in s may raise or lower pi, total coverage
σi(=s+pi) increases: there is less than complete crowding-out of private

















which is positive. Therefore the compensated eﬀect of a change of s in
zi (d˜ zi/ds) is also positive. Thus the eﬃciency term in expression (17) is
positive, guaranteeing that, with a positive covariance term, social insurance
coverage is never negative.
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